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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
UNITED AMERICAN LIFE INSURANCE 
COMPANY, a corporation, and ZIONS FIRST 
NATIONAL BANK, National Association, a 
rorporation, 
Plaintiffs-Respondents 
vs. 
GARY J. WILLEY and JEAN M. WILLEY, 
his wife, HORIZON INVESTMENT COR-
PORATION, a corporation, OAK HILLS REC-
REATION CLUB, a corporation, WESTERN 
STATES INVESTMENT, INC., a corporation, 
WESTERN STATES TITLE INSURANCE 
COMP ANY, a corporation, TOWNE APTS., a 
corporation, INTERMOUNTAIN CAPITAL 
CORPORATION, a corporation, WILLIAM 
MARCUS, ROCKY MOUNTAIN REFRIGER-
ATION, INC., HOLBROOK COMPANY, UTAH 
STATE TAX COMMISSION, IDEAL ELEC-
TRIC COMPANY, NATIONAL SURETY COR-
PORATION, OLYMPIA SALES COMPANY, 
UTAH CONCRETE PIPE COMPANY, FED-
ERAL BUILDING & LOAN, MELVIN E. 
INGERSOLL, THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA, R. W. TAYLOR STEEL CO., LUCY 
STACY, CHARLESWORTH PLUMBING & 
HEATING CO., and DOHRMANN COMPANY, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 
11086 
BRIEF 0'F RESP'ONDENTS 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
'L1his is a suit containing five causes of action which 
\Yas commenced by plaintiffs for the purpose of fore-
(']0sing the liens of a trust deed, a chattel mortgage, 
1 
three mortgages, and a conditional sales contract PXe-
cuted by the appellants, Gary J. -Willey, Jean M. WillPy 
and Horizon Investment Corporation, in which appellant~ 
interposed the defense and counterclaim of usury insofar 
as plaintiffs' first cause of action was concerned. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment based npon 
the pleadings, the deposition of defendant-appellant Gan 
J. Willey and the uncontroverted affidavits attached to 
plaintiffs' motion. Defendants-appellants also moved for 
summary judgment, based upon the pleadings and upon 
a legal memorandum filed by defendants-appellants in 
support of their motion. The lower court granted plain-
tiffs' motion for summary judgment and denied defend-
ants appellants' motion. Judgment was entered which 
(1) dismissed with prejudice defendants - appellants' 
counterclaims, (2) decreed the amounts due to respond-
ent, United American Life Insurance Company from the 
defendants-appellants on United American Life Insur-
ance Company's various liens, (3) decreed the amount' 
due to numerous other parties from def endants-apprl-
lants, ( 4) determined the priority of the liens of re-
spondent and the other parties, and ( 5) ordered tlw 
various properties sold and the proceeds applie<l in 
satisfaction of the liens of the various parties in the 
order of their priority. 
After judgment was entered, defcndants-appcllanhl, 
in lieu of filing a supersedeas bond, moved the lower co11rt 
for an order staying any further proceedings until this 
2 
appral has been heard by the Utah Supreme Court. 
This motion was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellants seek reversal of the summary judgment 
awarded in favor of plaintiff, United American Insur-
ance Company, on the first cause of action, and seek 
an order extending appellants' redemption rights for a 
period of six months after termination of this litigation. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following are the facts as testified to by the 
appellant Gary J. Willey in his deposition. 
Horizon Investment Corp,. is a corporation which 
was organized in 1963 by Gary J. Willey and Jean M. 
Willey, his wife, for the purpose of constructing a Coun-
try Club on property located in Weber County, Utah. 
Gary J. Willey and Jean M. Willey are the sole stock-
holders of the corporation and Gary J. Willey is its 
president while Jean M. Willey is its Secretary. (R. 28, 
P. 4-5) (Unless otherwise stated all references in this 
Brief to the record will refer to pages in the deposition 
of appellant Gary J. Willey). By October of 1964 the 
appellants had become indebted to Zions First National 
Dank (hereinafter referred to as "Zions") in the sum 
of T·wo HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND DOL-
LARS ($270,000.00) on prior loans which Zions had 
made to appellants to finance the construction of the 
Country Club (p. 13). In October of 1964 appellant 
Uary J. "Willey approached Zions and requested a loan 
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of FOUR HUNDRED l!'Il!''l1 Y rrHOUSAND DOLLAH~ 
($450,000.00) for the purpose of paying off the existing 
r_f'WO HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND DOLLAR 
( $270,000.00) in de Ltedness and of obtaining ad<li tional 
capital. Zions refused to loan appellants any furtl!Pr 
money unless appellants would get a written commitment 
from some insurance company to purchase the loan from 
Zions should Zions so demand. (p. 14). Zions did not 
tell appellants from whom to get the commitment. ThP 
only thing demanded by Zions was that the commitment 
would require the company issuing it to purclia~e thr 
loan from Zions should Zions so demand and that the 
company issuing the commitment be substantial enough 
to take up the loan. (p. 17, 18). 
Appellant Gary J. Willey, through a broker hy the 
name of Jesse Noble, contacted United American Life 
Insurance Company (hereinafter called "United Anwri-
can") and requested United American to issue the <'Oltl-
mitment which Zions required as a condition to making 
appellants the FOUR HUNDRB~D FIFTY THOUSAND 
DOLLAR ($450,000.00) loan. (p. 11, 15). Mr. Noble was 
the agent of appellant Gary J. Willey and neither :Mr. 
Noble, nor his associate, Mr. Robert Campbell, were 
employees of United American. (p. 15). 
After some negotiations, United American agreed 
to issue its commitment to Zions for a fee of $9,000.00, 
two per cent of the principal amount of the loan. (p. 21) 
In addition, appellants agreed to deposit the sum of 
FORTY FIVE THOUSAND DOLLARS ($45,000.00) 
with United American. If Zions did not require Unitrd 
4 
American to purchase the loan or if appellants refinanced 
th~ loan, or if appellants obtained some third party to 
purchase the loan from Zions, then the FORTY FIVE 
THOUSAND DOLLAR ($45,000.00) deposit would be 
returned to appellants, with interest. (pp. 45-46, 69-70) 
On the basis of United American's commitment Zions 
loaned appellants FOUR HUNDRED FIFTY THOUS-
AND DOLLARS ($450,000.00). A little over a year 
passed, during which time appellants did not refinance 
the loan or obtain a third party to purchase it from 
Zions. In January 1966, Zions demanded that United 
American purchase the loan and United American pur-
chased the loan from Zions as they were required to do 
by the commitment. (p. 27) Appellants made none of the 
payments which thereafter came due on the loan and in 
October of 1966 foreclosure proceedings were instituted. 
(p. 25) 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ALL OF THE FACTS UPON WHICH THE SUM-
MARY JUDGMENT IS BASED ARE UNCONTESTED 
FACTS, BEING THE FACTS AS TESTIFIED TO 
BY THE APPELLANT, GARY J. WILLEY, IN HIS 
DEPOSITION, AND, WHERE THERE ARE NO GEN-
UINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT TO BE TRIED, 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT SHOULD BE GRANTED. 
The respondents agree basically with appellant's gen-
eral Htatements concerning summary judgment. It is true 
that summary judgment is a drastic remedy which should 
be granted only when it is clear that there are no genuine 
is::mes of material fact to be resolved. That is exactly 
the situation which exists in this case. 
5 
The facts upon which the summary judgment j3 
based are not the facts as alleged by United American. 
They are the facts as testified to under oath by thP 
appellant, Gary J. Willey, in his deposition. United 
American for the purpose of its motion for summary 
judgment, conceded that everything that Gary J. Willey 
testified to was absolutely true. Under these circum-
stances, summary judgment was properly granted. As 
stated by the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Samms 
v. Eccles, 11 U.2d 289, 358 Pac.2nd 344, 345: 
"A motion for ~mmmary judgment is in effect 
a demurrer to the claims of the plaintiff, saying: 
Assuming they are true no right to recover is 
shown." 
Assuming that everything which Gary Willey testi-
fied to in his deposition is absolutely true, and based 
upon that deposition, summary judgment should have 
been granted since the testimony of Gary Willey himself 
established there was no violation of the usury laws. 
As pointed out by the Utah Supreme Court in the 
case of Dupler vs. Yates, 10 U.2d 251, 351 Pac.2d 624 
(1960) there can be no stronger evidence in support of 
a movant's motion for summary judgment than the sworn 
testimony of the opponent himself. In that case, the 
the defendant in a fraud action introduced in support 
of his motion for summary judgment depositions of the 
plaintiff wherein the plaintiff had testified that he had 
relied on the statements of persons other than the de-
fendant in entering into the transaction in question. 'l'he 
Supreme Court in holding that defendant's motion for 
6 
summary judgment had been properly granted stated at 
pp. G35-636 of its opinion: 
"In contrast to self-serving declarations usu-
ally proffered by movants for summary judgment. 
these statements are made by the opposing par-
ties themselves. Presenting at most improbable 
questions of credibility these documentary state-
ments have a high degree of probative value." 
In spite of this, the appellants contend that there 
are genuine issues of fact involved in this action which 
should be resolved by trial. However, as stated by the 
8upreme Court in the case of Menlove vs. Salt Lake 
County, 18 U.2d 203, 418 Pac.2d 227 (1966): 
"Rule 56, U.R.C.P. dictates the granting of 
summary judgment where there is no genuine 
issue of material fact. The whole purpose of sum-
mary judgment would be defeated if a case could 
be forced to go to trial by a mere assertion that 
an issue exists." 
The six asserted issues of fact which appellants 
claim should preclude the granting of summary judgment 
in this case are set forth on page 13 of appellants' brief. 
'l1he first of these asserted issues is "whether the com-
missions paid to Noble and Campbell should be consid-
Pred as interest." 
This is the first time that this alleged issue has been 
raised by the appellants. This claim was never asserted 
in either the answer and counterclaim of the appellants 
(R. 5) or in their amended counterclaim (R. 24). It is 
\l'Pll settled in this state that the Supreme Court will 
7 
not consider issues which are raised for the first tirnP 
on appeal. In re: Ekkers Estate, 432 Pac.2d 45 (Utah, 
1967); American Oil Company vs. General Contracti11g 
Corp., 17 U.2d 330, 411 Pac.2d 486 (1966); Hamilto11 cs. 
Salt Lake Compauy Sewerage Improvement District 
No. 1, 15 U.2d 216, 390 Pac.2d 235 (1964); Tygescn vs. 
Magna Waer Co., 13 U.2d 397, 375 Pac.2d 456 (19G2); 
Carson vs. Douglas, 12 U.2d 424, 307 Pac.2d 462 (1%2): 
North Salt Lake vs. St. Joseph Water & Irrigation Com 
pany, 118 Utah 600, 223 Pac.2d 577 (1950); Neilso11 rs. 
};isen, 116 Ut. 343, 209 Pac.2d 928 (1949); 
Even if this question had been raised in the lower 
court the testimony of the appellant Gary J. Willey 
effectively disposes of this alleged issue. It is almost 
universally recognized that a payment by a borrower 
to his own agent of a commission for procuring a loan 
from a lender cannot make the loan usurious. An exten-
sive annotation on this point is contained in 52 ALR 2d 
703 wherein it is stated at page 710: 
"It has generally been held or recognized that 
a lender cannot he charged ·with nsnry on account 
of any commission or bonus paid by the borrower 
to his mvn ag0nt, or to an independent broker, 
for services in negotiating or procuring the loan." 1 
This statement is supported in the annotation by 
numerous cases from 31 different jurisdictions. 
The appellant Gary J. Willey testified in his depo8i-
tion that he contacted Mr. Campbell, who in turn, con-
tacted Mr. Noble, who, as agent for appellants in turn 
approached United American for the purpose of obtain 
ing the commitment required by Zions. 
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"Q. When did you first contact United American? 
"A. The contact was not made by myself. 
"Q. Who was it made by? 
"A. It was made by a Mr. Jess Noble of Denver, 
Colorado. 
"Q. And who is Mr. Noble? 
"A. He was a former employee of United Ameri-
can, and is now - I would say he considers 
himself a broker. (p. 11) 
"Q. Now how did you get in touch with Mr. Noble 
regarding him procuring a loan? 
"A. This \Vas through a gentleman by the name 
of Robert Campbell of Denver, Colorado. 
(p. 12) 
"Q. Then I assume this was when you approached 
United American Life? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you requested them to give Zions a com-
mitment to take out the loan? 
"A. This was requested by Mr. Nob le, my agent 
in the matter or broker. 
"Q. On behalf of Horizon? 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And when did this take place? 
"A. November of 1965. 
"Q. Now, were all the negotiations for obtaining 
of this loan commitment from United Ameri-
can made through your agent, Mr. Noble? 
"A. You say all of the negotiations? 
"Q. Yes. 
"A. Through Mr. Noble and Mr. Campbell, the 
two of them. They both received a fee for 
this. 
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"Q. Was Mr. Noble at this time employed by 
United American? 
"A. No. 
"Q. No? 
"A. No. 
"Q. Neither was Mr. Campbell? 
"A. No. (pp. 14-15)" 
The testimony of Gary \Villey is unequivocal on the 
point that the brokers involved in this transaction werr 
his own agents, and the law is unequivocal on the point 
that any payments made by a borrower to his own agent~ 
for procuring a loan cannot make the loan usurious. 
The second, third and fifth alleged issues of fact 
which appellants claim prevent the granting of sununary 
judgment are, " ( 2) whether the interest computations 
should be based upon the face amount of the note or 
on the amount received by the borrower, (3) whl'ther 
the interest should be computed on a per annum basis 
. . . ( 5) what effect the one year interim period had on 
the loan." None of these points invlove questions of 
fact at all. How interest should be computed in deter-
mining whether a loan is usurious and whether or not 
an interim period affects the application of the usury 
statutes are questions of law. 
"Summary judgment is proper where there 
is a question of law but no issue of fact. Grant 
of the motion is not precluded because the ques-
tion of law is important, difficult or complicated. 
It is for the court to decide whether full develop-
ment of the facts and surrounding circumstances 
will assist it in making a correct determination of 
the question of law. Normally where the onl,1· 
10 
conflict is as to what legal conclusions should be 
drawn from the undisputed facts, a summary judg-
ment should be entered." 3Barron and Holtzoff, 
Fed. Practice and Procedure, Section 1234, pp. 
126-128. 
All of the facts concerning the amount and terms 
of the loan, the interest rate provided by the note and 
application of the loan proceeds are all described in 
drtail in the deposition of the appellant, Gary Willey, 
and are set forth and analyzed in points 2, 3 and 4 of 
this Brief. Based upon these facts, the only question left 
for the trial court to decide was the legal question as 
to how the usury statute was to be applied. That the 
lower court properly applied the law in this case is here-
inafter set forth in points 2, 3 and 4 of this Brief. 
The fourth alleged issue of fact which appellants 
claim prevent the granting of summary judgment is 
''(4) whether there was a sale of credit." That the trans-
action between appellants and United American involved 
the sale of credit and not a loan by United American to 
appellants is covered in detail under Point 2 of this 
Brief. Suffice it to say at this point that all of the 
facts concerning this matter are testified to in detail 
hy the appellant Gary J. Willey in his deposition. Where, 
as here, the evidenciary facts in a case have been estab-
lished and there is only a conflict as to the conclusion to 
hP dra-wn from the undisputed facts, summary judgment 
~honld be rendered. Fox vs. Johnson, & Wimsatt, Inc., 
127 F.2d 729 (U.S. App. D.C. 1942) ; U. S. vs. Two 
Thonsa11d Tubitlar Plastic Cases, 231 F.Supp. 236 (D.C. 
Pa. 1964), affirmed 352 F.2nd 344; U. S. vs. General 
11 
Instrurnent Corp., 87 F.Supp. 157 (D.C.N.J. 1949); Ot1, 
& Co., vs. Pennsylvania RR Co., 61 F. 8upp. 905 (D.C.Pa. 
1945), affirmed 155 F.2d 522; Trinity Universal In0itr-
ance Co. vs. Woody, 47 F.Supp. 327 (D.C.N.J. 1942); 
3Barron & Holtzoff, Section 1234, supra. 
The sixth alleged issue of fact which appellants claim 
prevents the granting of surmnary judgment is ''(G) 
whether a service charge was specifically designated." 
By this, the appellants are apparently referring to 
whether there was any specific designation concerning 
the NINE THOUSAND DOLLAR fee paid to United 
American for its commitment or concerning the $45,000 
deposit made by the appellants. The testimony of the 
defendant Gary J. Willey establishes that there was a 
specific designation concerning the $9,000 fee as well 
as concerning the $45,000 deposit. Gary "Willey testified 
at pp. 49 and 50 of his deposition that the $9,000 fee 
was specifically designated in both the disburseirn•nt 
schedule and the commitment which was given to Zions: 
"Q. What document would the $9,000 be men-
tioned in? 
"A. In the disbursement of the total loan. Dis-
bursement schedule, I am quite sure it was 
there. 
"Q. Did you ever see a written agreement con-
cerning the $9,000 and what it was to be 
applied to? 
"A. I think the $9,000 is stated in the commitment 
between United American and Zions as a loan 
fee for the commitment, from what I recall.'' 
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rL1he deposition of appellant Gary J. Willey also 
e~tahlishes that there was a specific designation relating 
io the $45,000 deposit. In discussing what the $45,000 
deposit was for, Gary Willey testified as follows: 
"Q. What happened if you didn't get somebody 
else to purchase the notes and trust instru-
ment. 
"A. They were to keep the $45,000. We'd signed 
an agreement to that effect. 
"Q. Do you have a copy of that agreement~ 
"A. I don't here, but I sure have one at home, 
or in the office I should say. I do have a 
copy." (p. 46) 
All six of the alleged ISsues of fact set forth by 
appellants on p. 13 of their Brief are either not properly 
before this court, or are not issues of fact at all but are 
Y.Uestions of law which were properly decided by the 
lower court, or are matters which were conclusively 
Pstablished for purposes of respondent's motion for 
summary judgment by the sworn testimony of the appel-
lant Gary J. Willey. That there are no issues of fact 
\ 11hich would prevent the granting of summary judgment 
in this case appears to be admitted by the appellants 
theirn_;elves at p. 3 of their Brief wherein they state, 
"The facts as set forth on file and particularly in the 
deposition of defendant Gary J. Willey were basically 
undisputed." 
13 
POINT II 
THE TRANSACTION BETWEEN UNITED AMERI-
CAN AND APPELLANTS INVOLVED A SALE OF 
CREDIT BY UNITED AMERICAN TO APPELLANTS 
SO THAT APPELLANTS ON THE BASIS OF 
UNITED AMERICAN'S CREDIT WOULD BE ABLE 
TO OBTAIN A LOAN FROM ZIONS, AND SUCH A 
LOAN OF CREDIT IS NOT GOVERNED BY THE 
USURY STATUTES. 
According to the testimony of the appellant Gary .T. 
\Villey, the $9,000 paid to United American and the 
$45,000 deposited with United American were paid, not 
to obtain a loan of money from United American, but to 
obtain the credit of United American in the form of 
United American's written commitment to purchase the 
loan from Zions on Zions' demand, so that Zions, on the 
basis of United American's credit would make the loan 
to appellants. United American issued its commitment 
to Zions and Zions, on the basis of United American's 
credit, loaned the money to appellants. No money was 
ever loaned by United American to appellants. 
The usury statutes are inapplicable to a transaction 
such as is described in the deposition of the appellant 
Gary J. Willey. 
"If a transaction amounts merely to a sale 
of credit it is well settled that the usury law is 
inapplicable." 104 ALR 245. 
This is the law in the state of Utah. As stated by 
the Utah Supreme Court in the case of Rossuerg vs. 
Holesapple, 123 Ut. 529, 260 P.2d, 563, 566 (1953) 
"It is well established that a sale of credit, as 
distinguished from a loan of money, does not conw 
within the purview of usury laws." 
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The case which was cited by the Utah Supreme Court 
in support of this rule is the case of Oil City Motor Co. 
L'S. CIT Corporation, 76 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1935). This 
case concerned an involved situation whereby plaintiff 
automobile dealer purchased automobiles from the manu-
facturer through sight drafts drawn on and paid by 
the defendant. Although the fees received by the de-
fendant for this service far exceeded the amounts per-
mitted under the usury laws, the court held there was 
no violation of the usury statutes. 
"Instead of making a loan of money, defend-
ant lent or extended its credit which plaintiff 
used in the operation of its retail business. A 
return demanded and received for a bona fide 
loan or extension of credit as distinguished from 
a loan of money does not taint the transaction 
with usury regardless of the amount." 
A case involving a fact situation very similar to the 
one before this court is Lynn vs. McCue, 94 Kan. 761, 
147 Pac.808 (1915). This case involved a construction 
company (the borrower) a trust company and a bank. 
~'he facts of the case and the holding of the court are 
set forth by the court as follows: 
"The construction company applied to the 
trust company for a loan of $400,000. The trust 
company at first considered making it, but finally 
refused to do so on the ground that the highest 
lawful rate of interest was not sufficient compen-
sation, in view of the risk involved. Then the 
trust company offered to procure the loan from 
the bank for a commission of $60,000 and the offer 
·was accepted and carried ont. To induce the bank 
to make the loan, the trust company agreed to 
take it up at any time on demand of the bank, 
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and within a short time did so. If the deal wa, 
just what it was purported to be, it was legiti-
mate; the $60,000 was paid as a commission and 
not as interest and did not constitute usury." 
The most recent case on this point appears to lw 
Gilmer vs. w oodson, 332 F.2d 541 (4th Cir. 1964). rrhP 
case involved a claim of usury arising out of the develop-
ment of a subdivision. The developer needed large ::;mn~ 
of money to construct improvements in the subdivi::;ion. 
He approached a bank to obtain these funds and the bank 
agreed to provide the funds, providing the plaintiff 
would endorse the unsecured notes evidencing the loans. 
For endorsing the notes the developer was to pay the 
plaintiff fees of from three to six per cent of the amount 
of the notes. After lending money to the developer for 
approximately two years, on this basis, the bank required 
the developer to execute a trust deed to secure the 
amounts which had been loaned. The developer later got 
into financial difficulty the bank demanded payment from 
the plaintiff of all of the notes which had been endorsed 
by plaintiff and the plaintiff purchased the notes from 
the bank and took an assignment of the trust deed. In 
this case, between the plaintiff and the developer's trustee 
in bankruptcy the trustee raised the defense of usury, 
claiming that the interest provided by the notes plus 
the fees charged by plaintiff were interest charges in 
excess of those permitted by statute. This contention 
was rejected by the court, which held that the fres 
charged by plaintiff were for a loan of credit and did 
not violate the usury laws. The court stated: 
"HO\vever, it is clear from the record as found 
by the District Court that the bank, not Gilnwr 
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was the actual lender, that the bank had no inter-
est whatsoever in such payments and that the 
fees or charges were not usurious. The District 
Court properly reversed the findings and conclu-
sions of the referee and held that the endorse-
ments fees to Gilmer, both paid and unpaid, were 
lawful. See Chakalcs vs. Djiovamidcs, 161 Va.48, 
170 S.E.848 (1933); Keagy vs. Trout, 85 Va.390, 
7 S.E.329 ( 1888) ; Ann. 52 AtL·R 2d 703, 710 ( 1957)" 
Other cases involving similar fact situations are 
1lfarphy vs. Leiber, 76 Ariz.79, 259 P.2d 249 (1953), and 
Kahan vs. Schonwald, 192 Okla.307, 135 P.2d 971 (1943). 
In the Murphy vs. Leiber case, the court held as follows: 
"The trial court having found as a fact that 
the conveyance of Section 29 to defendants by 
plaintiffs was made in consideration of def end-
ants loaning their credit to plaintiff the conclu-
sion of law that the transaction was not usurious 
is inescapable for the reason that usury laws have 
no application to a loan or sale of credit." 
In the Kahan vs. Schonwald case, the Supreme Court 
in upholding the denial of defendant's motion to amend 
his answer so as to plead the defense of usury stated: 
"The contention that it was error to deny 
the defendant leave to amend his answer so as 
to plead usury in the transaction is wholly unten-
able. The evidence shows that the note involved 
had been given in consideration of the services 
of the plaintiff in going surety on a note for 
$10,000 ·which defendant executed to the First 
National Bank to Gutherie to obtain a loan of 
money from such institution and that as between 
plaintiff and defendant the relation of borrower 
and lender was non-existent. Usury can be plead 
only where the relation of borrower and lender 
exi~ts between the parties." 
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The sworn testimony of the appellant Gary J. Willey 
establishes conclusively that the transaction between 
United American and appellants in this case involved a 
sale of credit by United American to appellants, in tlw 
form of United American's commitment to Zions, so 
that Zions, on the basis of United American's credit 
would make appellant the $450,000.00 loan. The facts m: 
testified to by Gary J. Willey are as follows: 
Prior to the time United American ever became 
involved in this matter, appellants had become indebtrd 
to Zions in the sum of $270,000.00. (p. 13) Appellants 
contacted Zions to have the loan increased to $450,000.00 
but Zions refused to loan appellants any further money 
unless appellants would furnish Zions with a commitment 
from some third party which ·would obligate the third 
party to purchase the loan from Zions, or make a iw"· 
loan to pay off Zions, should Zions so demand. Zion~ 
did not indicate to appellants from whom to get tlw 
commitment. It was then that appellants approached 
United American, through appellants' own agent, anil 
requested United American to give tht> commitment so 
that Zions would make the loan to appellants. 
"Q. When did yon go to Zions, or did .Yon go to 
Zions to see about increasing this $270,000 
lo'an. 
"A. Yes, I did. 
"Q. When was that? 
"A. That was the latter part of October or the 
first part of N overnber. 
"Q. \Vhat did yon "'ant it increased to 1 
"A. Approximak,ly $Mi0,000.00. 
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"Q. Did you see Mr. Hintze regarding this par-
ticular loan~ 
"A. Mr. Hintze and Mr. Roy Simmons. 
"Q. And did Zions at that time make you a $450,-
000.00 loan~ 
"A. No. They said it was necessary to secure a 
long term commitment before they "\vould be 
willing to issue $450,000.00. 
"Q. They wouldn't make the loan unless you had 
a commitment from somebody else to pur-
chase the loan or make a new loan to take 
them out~ 
"A. They made a loan of $270,000.00 without the 
long term condition. The additional money 
they required the commitment. 
"Q. Did they state from whom they would accept 
a commitmenU 
"A. No. 
"Q. Then I assume this was when you approached 
United American Life~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And you requested them to give Zions a com-
mitment to take out the loan~ 
"A. This was requested by Mr. Noble, my agent 
in the matter, or broker. 
"Q. On behalf of Horizon~ 
"A. Yes. (p. 14-15) 
"Q. Did you explain to United American that you 
had applied to Zions for a $450,000.00 loan~ 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And that Zions had agreed to make you a 
$450,000 loan providing you could get a com-
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mitment from some other organization to pur-
chase it? 
"A. It was stated from an insurance company -
a commitment from an insurance company, 
and one that ·was substantial enongh to mah 
the loan. (p. 16-17) 
After some negotiations United American issued th~ 
required commitment to Zions and Zions made the $450,-
000 loan to appellants. United American charged appd-
lants $9,000.00 for issuing the commitment and in addi-
tion, required appellants to deposit $45,000.00 with UnitPd 
American. If United American was not required by 
Zions to purchase the loan, or if appellants secured 
another company to purchase the loan from Zions, or 
if appellants refinanced the Zions loan, the $45,000.00 
deposit would be returned to appellants, with interest. 
"Q. 
"A. 
"Q. 
"A. 
"Q. 
Now, wlwn did Unikd Anwrican agrPP to 
give you a commitment? 
It -vrns approximately December 10th that tht>y 
sent the commitment over. Mr. Campbell and 
Mr. Noble were here in Salt Lah. They re-
ceived the commitment by Air ExprPss -
REA, I should say, and it was taken into 
Zions National Bank and discussed ·with Mr. 
Hintze. (P. 17) 
The commitment, did it give Zions the right 
to require United American to buy this loan 
from them, was that the form of the com-
mitment? 
Would yon state that again"? Give t11m1 tll\' 
right? 
Did it give~ Zions the right to require Unitt>cl 
American to buy the loan that Zions \\H~ 
making to you? 
20 
"A. Yes, I would say so, subject to marketable 
title and various things that were necessary. 
"Q. When was yom loan closed with Zions, that 
is your $450,000 loan 7 
"A. From what I recall, it was approximately 
December 15. (p. 18-19) 
"Q. Mr. Willey, I'm a little confused by the fi-
nancing arrangements you had with United 
American Life and Zions Bank, particularly 
in regard to $45,000 which apparently yon 
deposited in your account and then wrote a 
check to, I believe you said, United American 
Life. Could you explain to me what that 
was for? 
"A. This fee was held strictly for the purpose 
of them issuing a commitment. If I were to 
secure another company to take Zions Na-
tional Bank out of the loan, the fee was to 
be returned to me. 
"Q. It was to be returned to you 7 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. If you found another company7 
"A. Yes. (p. 45) 
"Q. Now, the $9,000 that you referred to that you 
sent to United American Life, that was 
another fee separate and apart from the 
$45,000 fee7 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. Who did that go to 7 
"A. United American Life. This was for the issu-
ance of the commitment. (P. 48-49) 
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A little over a year after the commitment was issued 
Zions demanded that United American purchase the loan 
pursuant to the terms of the commitment and the loan 
was purchased by United American from Zions and 
United American paid Zions for purchase of the loan 
in January, 1966. 
"A .... But United paid Zions off, so it went into 
'66. I \Vas wrong in December of '6G. It wa~ 
the latter part of January of '66 when United 
American sent a check to Zions National 
Bank. 
"Q. And purchased this loan from Zions? 
"A. That's right. 
"Q. Pursuant to the commitment that they had 
already issued? 
"A. Yes. (p. 27) 
The transaction between United American and appel-
lants is summarized by the appellant Gary J. -Wille>· at 
pp. 69-70 of his deposition as follows: 
"Q. I just want to go back for a minute, Mr. 
Willey, on this $9,000 and $45,000. Tht>se 
amounts wen~ paid, yon say, to Unih·d Amrri-
can to get them to give this cornmitme11t to 
Zions so Zions wonld make you the loan 1 
"A. Definitely. 
"Q. And if United American was requirrd hy 
Zions to buy the loan at the end of tlw 
year, United Anwrican would keep the moneyl 
"A. Definitely. 
"Q. If yon went out and were abh~ to get financing 
s01"newhere else to pa:' off Zions so th'.lt 
United AmL'rican wonldn't haw to hn:· 1t, 
then yon would get $45,000 baek? 
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"A. I would get that returned, plus interest. 
"Q. Plus interest 1 
''A. Yes. 
Respondents agree with the general statements con-
tained in appellant's brief to the effect that the court 
should carefully scrutinize every transaction in which 
usury is pleaded to determine whether the transaction in-
volved is in actuality a loan of money or whether it is a sale 
of credit. The principal test apparently used by the courts 
in determining whether a particular transaction involves 
a loan of money or a sale of credit is set forth as follows 
in an annotation on this point at 104 ALR 245, 246: 
"Again, consideration must be given to the 
particular facts to determine whether one of the 
parties to the transaction is to advance money, 
or whether the advance is to be made in the first 
instance by a third party. If, for instance, the 
transaction is one not contemplating the imme-
diate advance of money by a party thereto, but 
merely a means of enabling one of the parties to 
procure funds from a third party, or otherwise 
meet his immediate financial needs, it is properly 
deemed a sale of credit, as regards application 
of the usury statutes, although eventually the 
party permitting the use of his credit has to ad-
vance the money before he is placed in funds or 
property by the one receiving the credit." 
The testimony of Gary J. Willey on this point is 
clear and definite. The loan to appellants was not made 
b~, United American, whom appellants contend exacted 
the usurious interest, but was made by Zions. The pay-
ments made by appellants to United American and the 
amount deposited with United American by appellants 
23 
was a means of appellants obtaining the conunitment 
' 
thereby enabling appellant's to procure the loan from 
Zions to meet appellants' immediate financial needs. 'l'he 
transaction between United American and appellants is 
thus properly deemed a sale of credit as regards the 
application of the usury statutes. The fact that Zion8 
eventually required United American to purchase the 
loan and that United American did eventually pay Zions 
$450,000 and took an assignment of the loan as United 
American was required to do by the commitment, doPo 
not alter the situation. 
As pointed out in the case of Kahan v. Schonwalrl 
and Gilmer vs. Woodson, supra, "Usury can be plead 
only where the relation of borrower and lender exists 
between the parties." The testimony of Gary Wille!· , 
is clear on the point that no such relation ever existed 
between appellants and United American, who appellants 
claim exacted the usurious interest. The loan ·was made 
by Zions to appellants and it was Zions money which was 
loaned to appellants. (p. 18-21) None of United Ameri-
can's money was ever loaned to appellants. Over a year 
after the commitment was issued, Zions demanded that 
United American purchase the loan as United American 
was required to do by the commitment, and United 
American sent a check for $450,000 to Zions and pur-
chased the loan from Zions. 
The insinuations and innuendos contained in appel-
lants' brief that there existed some insidious schenw lw-
tween Zions and United American to avoid the n~nn· 
laws is not only without any fonndation in the record, 
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but is completely refuted by Gary J. Willey in his depo-
sition. Appellants sought the $450,000 loan from Zions, 
but were informed by Zions that no loan would be made 
without the required commitment. (p. 12, 14) Zions did 
not tell appellants from whom they would accept the 
commitment. (p. 14) Zions only requirement was that the 
commitment be issued by a company substantial to take 
up the loan. (p. 16-17) Appellants then contacted United 
American, through appellants' own agent, and requested 
United American to give Zions the commitment. (p. 14-
15) After some negotiations, details concerning the com-
mitment were worked out between appellants and United 
American, including the payment of the $9,000 commit-
ment fee and the $45,000 deposit. Zions never knew 
anything about the requirement of $45,000 deposit. (p. 47) 
The testimony of Gary J. Willey establishes beyond 
question that the transaction between United American 
and appellants involved a sale of credit by United Amer-
ican to appellants in the form of a commitment, so that 
Zions on the basis of United American's credit would 
loan appellants the $450,000. None of United American's 
money was ever loaned to appellants and the relationship 
of borrower and lender has never existed between appel-
lants and United American. No scheme ever existed be-
tween United American and Zions to evade the usury 
statutes. 
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POINT III 
THE RIGHT OF UNITED AMERICAN TO RETAIN 
THE $45,000 DEPOSIT WAS BASED ON A CONTIN-
GENCY WHICH WAS COMPLETELY BEYOND THE 
CONTROL OF UNITED AMERICAN, AND A CON-
TRACT IS NOT USURIOUS WHICH PROVIDES FOR 
THE PAYMENT, ON A CONTINGENCY, OF A RE-
TURN IN EXCESS OF THAT PERMITTED BY 
STATUTE, WHERE THE HAPPENING OF THE 
CONTINGENCY IS NOT CONTROLLED BY THE 
CREDITOR. 
Law on this point is set forth m 91 C.J.S. Usury, 
Section 31 ( c) as follows : 
As a general rule, a contract of loan or for-
bearance is not usurious because stipulating for 
the payment, on a contingency, of interest or a 
return in excess of that permitted by law, 1d1eri· 
the contingency is nnder the control of the debtor. 
A debtor may not, by his voluntary act, rendPr 
a transaction usurious which, but for such circum-
stances, would be entirely fret> from a claim of 
usury. Thus, where the terms of a contract per-
mit the debtor to discharge himself by paying the 
sum lawfully due on or before a specified datP, 
a provision imposing on him a more burdensolllP 
payment, although exceeding the rate of retmn 
allowed by law, in the nature of a lwnalt:-· for a 
failure to pay by the date so specified, will not 
render the contract usurious, even though the 
penalt)T so imposed is the payment of a flat su]l]. 
Similarly, a contract is not usurious altliough 
it provides for the payment of an excessivl, return 
to the creditor, where it is further stipnlatr'd that 
the obligation may he discharged by the pnyrn('.nt 
of the principal sum and not more than hmftil 
interest 'vithin or by a specified time, unless s11eh 
stipulation for payrncnt is colorahle only a11o 
made with intent to evadt> the nsnry laws. 
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This is the situation which exists in this case. 
According to the testimony of the appellant Gary J. 
Willey, the $45,000 was deposited with United American 
and could be retained by United American only if United 
American was ultimately required to purchase the loan 
from Zions as it was required to by its commitment. If, 
howc>ver, (1) Zions did not make demand upon United 
American to purchase the loan, or ( 2) even if Zions did 
demand that United American purchase the loan but 
appellants obtained some third party to purchase the 
loan pursuant to Zions demand, or (3) if Zions demanded 
that United American purchase the loan but appellants 
refinanced the loan and paid off Zions, then in any 
one of the above instances, the $45,000 would be returned 
to appellants, with interest. The testimony of the appel-
lant Gary Willey on this matter is as follows: 
"Q. I just want to go back for a minute, Mr. 
Willey, on this $9,000 and $45,000. These 
amounts were paid, you say, to United Ameri-
can to get them to give this commitment to 
Zions so Zions would make you the loan~ 
"A. Definitely. 
"Q. And if United American was required by 
Zions to buv the loan at the end of the year, 
United Am~rican would keep the money~ 
"A. Definitely. 
"Q. And if yon went out and were able to get 
financing somewhere else to pay off Zions 
so that United American wouldn't have to 
buy it, then you would get the $45,000 back? 
"A. I would get that returned, plus interest. 
"Q. Plus interesU 
"A. Yes. (p. 69-70) 
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Whether the $45,000 deposit \rnnld he retained hv 
United American, or whether it would be returned t~ 
appellants, with interest, was based on three contin-
gencies, the happening of any one of which would reqnin 
the return of the $45,000 to appellants, with interest. 
The happening of any of these contingencies was ont of 
the control of United American and the happening of two 
of the contingencies was within the exclusive control of 
the appellants. 
The payment of the $9,000 to United American a~ a 
commitment fee could not, of itself, make the loan usur-
ious. This sum coupled with the eight percent interest 
provided by the note, does not exceed the amount \rhich 
appellants could have been charged as interest for tl1I' 
year the commitment was to run, had the note bel'n 
written at the maximum pt>rmissible interest rate of ten 
per cent. 
POINT IV 
THE $9,000 PAID TO UNITED AMERICAN FOR 
THE COMMITMENT, PLUS THE $45,000 DEPOSIT, 
WHEN ADDED TO THE INTEREST REQUIRED 
TO BE PAID BY THE TERMS OF THE NOTE, IS 
LESS THAN THE AMOUNT OF INTEREST WHICH 
COULD HAVE BEEN LEGALLY CHARGED AND 
COLLECTED ON THE LOAN OVER THE TEN YEAR 
PERIOD THE NOTE HAD TO RUN, AND THE 
TRANSACTION, THEREFORE, DOES NOT VIO-
LATE THE USURY STATUTES. 
Even if United American had made a loan of monc~­
rather than a sale of credit to appellants, and even if tlw 
$45,000 deposit had not been suhjPct to conditions ont-
side of United American's control, the transaction would 
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still not violate the usury statutes. The $9,000 c01mnit-
ment fee, plus the $45,000, when added to the interest 
which appellant were required to pay by the terms of 
tlw note, is less than the amount of interest which appel-
lants could have been charged under the Utah Usury 
Statutes during the term of the loan. It has long been 
established that the way to determine whether or not 
a payment made by a borrower to a lender to obtain 
a loan makes the loan usurious is to compute the total 
amount of interest which the borrower is required to pay 
hy thP terms of the note over the period the note has to 
nm and add to it amount of the payment made by the bor-
rom:r to obtain the loan. If this amount does not exceed 
the total amount which the lender could have collected on 
his loan at the maximum permissible legal rates for the 
f'ntire term of the loan then the payment made by the 
borrower to the lender does not make the loan usurious. 
Cases on this point from a dozen different jurisdictions 
are collected in an annotation at 57 ALR 2d 649. 
A case directly in point is Ricord Aragon, 115 Cal. 
App. 2d 176, 251 P. 2d 759 (1952). In that case plain-
tiffs obtained a loan of $27,000 from defendants and to 
induce the defendants to make the loan agreed to pay 
defendants a $4,000 bonus. Plaintiffs gave defendants 
a note for $31,000 representing the $27,000 loan plus the 
$4,000 bonus, bearing interest at seven per cent on the 
unpaid balance. Defendants took a trust deed from plain-
tiffs to secure the note and when plaintiffs default in pay-
ments, began foreclosure proceedings under the Cali-
fornia ':Prust Deed Act. The plaintiff brought this action 
to rl'Strain the foreclosure, to have the loan declared 
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usurious and to collect the interest previously paid. Thi· 
court upheld a judgment for the defendant lender8 in 
the case. The bonus of $4,000, plus the seven per cent 
1 jnterest on the note over the 58 months period the notP 
was to run amounted to less than the ten per cPnt inter-
est rate permitted by law and loan was not usurious. 
The most recent case on this point appears to be the 
case of Home Savings & Loan Association v. Bates, 7G 
N.Mex. 660, 417 P. 2d 798 (1966). Here, the plaintiff 
made a mortgage loan of $30,000 for a period of thirt~· 
years, bearing interest at 6.6 per cent. In addition, the 
borrower was chaged $1,085 as a fee for the loan. ThP 
plaintiffs sought to foreclose the mortgage and the de-
fense was interposed that the loan was usurious because 
of the $1,085 fee that was charged for making the loan. 
This contention was rejected by the New Mexico Suprenw 
Court and the judgment ordering foreclosure of thP 
mortgage was affirmed. The court stated: 
A proper test of usury is whether figuring 
all interest payments, including the portion pre-
paid, more than the authorized rate is required 
to be paid for tlw term the loan has to run ... · 
In the. present case, the sum, including the loan 
fee considPred and chargPd as interest upon the 
loan, does not exceed 10 per cent per annnrn, 
computed upon tlw full term of the loan. The 
undisputed evidence in the record fixes th~~ inter-
est rate, including and treating the loan fee as 
prepaid interest, at 6.85 per cent per annum. 
The applicable portion of the Utah usury statute 
1s set forth on page 7 of appPllants' brief. Under that 
statute the maximum amount which lenders can cJiargP 
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for a loan of money in the State of Utah is 4 per cent 
of the original principal amount of the loan, plus 10 
per cent per annum on the unpaid balance. This would 
permit a lender to charge a total of $282,359.54 on the 
note involved in this action over the 10 year period the 
note had to run. (See the computation attached to R. 30). 
The total interest collectible on the note as it is written 
with interest at 8 per cent per annum and with principal 
payrrnms payable quarterly would require defendants to 
pay only $211,538.27 over the 10 year period. (See com-
putation attached to R. 30) Add to this the $45,000 
deposit and the $9,000 commitment fee and the total 
amount collectible is still only $265,538.27, or $16,821.27 
less than the amount of interest which appellants could 
haye been charged without exceeding the usury statutes. 
There appears to be a split of authority as to how 
the aforementioned calculations should be made. 57 ALR 
2d 630. One group of jurisdictions holds that in deter-
mining the maximum amount which the lender can charge 
for the term of the loan, the maximum legal rates per-
rnitted by statute should be applied to the face amount 
of the note. e.g. Ricord v. Aragon and Home Savings & 
Loan Association v. Bates, supra. Another group of 
jnrisdictions has taken the position that the amount paid 
by the borrower to the lender for the loan should first 
be deducted from the face amount of the loan and that 
the maximum interest rates permitted by law should then 
he applied to this reduced figure. The latter method is 
the one which appellants urge should be adopted by this 
court, since this is the only method of computation by 
which the amounts paid in this case could be construea 
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to exceed the interest permitted by the Utah u:sury 
statute. 
This question of method of computation has newr 
been decided by this court. The matter was ne\-er evui 
raised in the case of National American Life f 11s11ranc1 
Conipany v. Bayoit Cowitry ClitlJ, Jue., 15 Ut.2d 41i, 
403 P. 2d 26, which appellants cite in support of their 
position. 
The method which appellants urge this court to adopt 
is founded upon a logical inconsistency which respond-
ents contend should prevent its adoption. They begin by 
stating that the $9,000 commitment fee and the $45,00U 
deposit should be applied in reduction of the princi1ial 
balance of the $450,000 loan, thereby reducing this bal-
ance to $396,000, and it is this $396,000 figure to which 
the maximum permissible interest rates should be applied 
to determine the maximum amount of interest whirh 
could be collected on the loan. Appellants then turn 
around and state that the $9,000 commitment fee and tlw 
$45,000 deposit should be considered to be interest and 
should be added to the interest payments required by 
the terms of the note. This donhle application of the 
$9,000 commitment fee and the $45,000 deposit - stated 
by appellants in one breath to be a payment in reduction 
of the principal balance, and in the next, to be a paymrnt 
of interest - should be rejected by this court. It is 
suggested that perhaps a borrower should have his choice 
as to whether to consider such payment as a payment 
of interest, or \1-hether it should be applied in iwlnction o[ 
principal, but it is inconcPivahle that appellantf; could 
l1ave it at once be a payment in reduction of principal 
and, at the same time, a payment of interest. 
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POINT V 
THERE IS NO AUTHORITY UNDER UTAH LAW 
FOR A COURT TO EXTEND A REDEMPTION PER-
IOD IN FORECLOSURE ACTIONS, AND NO EX-
TENSION OF THE REDEMPTION PERIOD SHOULD 
BE GRANTED WHERE APPELLANTS FAILED TO 
AVAIL THEMSELVES OF AN ADEQUATE REM-
EDY WHICH IS PROVIDED BY LAW. 
The appellants have requested this court for an 
order extending their redemption rights until six months 
after termination of this litigation. Rule 69 (f) (3), Utah 
Hnles of Civil Procedure provides for a six month re-
demption period following the date of the Sheriff's Sale. 
There is no provision, either in the Rules or in Chapter 
37 of Title 78, dealing with mortgage foreclosures, which 
provides for any extension of this six month period of 
redemption. 
Rules 62( d) and 73( d), Utah Rules of Civil Proced-
ure, dealing with snperseadas bonds, provided appellants 
with adequate protection in this case. By filing a super-
seadas bond the appellants could have prevented Sher-
iff':::; Sale of the property from having taken place at all 
until after this appeal had been heard. This, the appel-
lants decided not to do. Instead, appellants filed a mo-
tion with the District Court to stay the sale of the 
property. This motion was made without any notice what-
~oever to any of the dozen other parties to the law suit 
who ·were also seeking to have the property sold to satisfy 
their liens. (R. 38) Under the circumstances the District 
Court had no alternative but to deny appellants motion 
for a stay. 
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The appellants, having failed to avail thernselnB 
of the protection which is afforded them by the filing 
of a superseadas bond, should not at this late date be 
awarded a remedy which is sanctioned by neither rule 
nor statute. 
CONCLUSION 
All of the facts upon which the summary judgments 
is based are the facts as testified to by the appellant 
Gary J. Willey in his deposition. There can be no stronger 
case in support of a motion for summary judgment than 
the sworn testimony of the person opposing the motion. 
In contrast to self-serving affidavits which are often 
made the basis for a motion for summary judgment, the 
foundation for the summary judgment in this case is the 
sworn testimony of appellant Gary J. Willey himself. 
It is his testimony which establishes that the usury claim 
of appellants is baseless and without merit. 
The appellant testified over and over again that the 
$9000 commitment fee and the $45,000 deposit were paid 
to United American, not to obtain a loan from United 
American, but to obtain the credit of United American 
in the form of a commitment, so that Zions, on the hasis 
of United American's credit would make the loan to 
appellants. The loan was not made by United American 
to appellants, but was made by Zions on the basis of 
United American's credit. The testimony of appellant 
Gary J. Willey further establishes that the transaction 
was not some scheme between United American and 
Zions to violate the usury statutes. Gary J. Willey testi-
fied that Zions did not tell appellants from whom to 
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obtain the required commitment; that appellants con-
tacted United American through appellants own agents 
and requested United American to give Zions the commit-
ment so that Zions, on the basis of that commitment, 
would make the loan to appellants; that Zions never even 
knew of the $45,000 deposit. The law is well settled that 
a ~,;ale of credit as is established by the testimony of 
appellant Gary J. Willey in this case does not come 
within the purview of the usury laws. The appellant 
Gary J. Willey was insistent in his claim that the right 
of United American to retain the $45,000 deposit was 
1·onditioned upon contingencies which were beyond the 
control of United American. He testified that should 
Zions not make demand upon United American to 
purchase the lo·an, or even if such demand was made 
hut appellants obtained some third party to purchase 
the loan, or if appellants refinanced the loan and paid 
off Zions so that United American did not have to 
buy it, that not only would the $45,000 be returned to 
appellants, but that it would be returned with interest. 
lt has generally been held that a charge of usury cannot 
be predicated upon such a conditional payment where the 
contingencies upon which the payment is made are out-
:side the control of the creditor. 
Even if the transaction involved m this case had 
not constituted a sale of credit, and even if the retention 
by United American of the $45,000 had not been subject 
to contingencies outside of United American's control, 
the transaction would still not violate the usury laws~ 
since the amount of the commitment fee and the amount 
of the deposit, when added to the total amount of interest 
35 
which appellants were required to pay by the ttmrn; of 
the note, is less than the amount appellants could haYe 
been charged as interest had the note been written at 
the highest lawful rate. The only way the commitment 
fee and deposit involved in this case could make the 
loan usurious, would be if this court adopted a method 
of computation which would apply the deposit and com-
mitment fee in reduction of the principal amount of the 
loan, and at the same time, treat them as paymenb of 
interest. 
Between December of 1965 and March of 1966, 
United American loaned appellants an additional $45,000 
to aid appellants in establishing a successfnl venture. 
1~wenty-five thousand of this amount was loaned to the 
appellants without interest. None of it ·was ever repaid. 
In the more than 20 months between the date Zions made 
its loan to appellants and the date these foreclosure pro-
ceedings were instituted, appellants made no pa)1nents 
\vhatsoever on the loan. The appe1lants should not be 
permitted through insinuation and innuendo, through 
strained construction of tlw facts and through urging 
thP court to adopt illogical rulrs of law, to tnrn the 
shield of the usury statutes into a sword. The decision of 
the lower court should be affirmed. 
Res1wctfully submitted, 
Roger .J. McDonough, of , 
JONES, WALDO, HOLBROOh. 
& McDONOUGH 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
Respondents 
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